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Taming the Golden Goose: Private
Companies, Consumer Geolocation
Data, and the Need for a Class Action
Regime for Privacy Protection
ABSTRACT
With the implementation of new geolocation technologies, the
boundaries between private versus commercial and secret versus easily
ascertainable have vanished. Consumer information that was once
very difficult and prohibitively expensive to ascertain, catalogue, and
recall is available to companies at the click of a button. Not only that,
but the collecting company can share consumer information with other
companies even more easily than it can initially collect the information.
Today, with the widespread use of smartphone and location-enabled
tablet devices, it is possible for location services to determine and plot
the location and travel of the device and thereby the travel and habits
of the owner. Companies can use the collected customer information to
sell products, and they can sell the information to third parties for a
variety of both benign and malicious purposes. Meanwhile, skilled
hackers can steal consumer information.
After analyzing the current legal landscape of consumer privacy
law as it relates to geolocation services, this Note argues that US and
global consumers need the United States to act. In order to foster trust
in corporations and the market, Congress should enact a framework
that assures consumers of sufficient protection of those details that
consumers hold intrinsically private, such as their personal ocations.
This Note concludes by examining the bills currently under
consideration by Congress and their respective deficiencies.
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The reality of our modern, wireless world is that the sharing of
information, particularly that of your geographical location
(geolocation) data, occurs every day.' In other words, like it or not, if
you have not opted out of being tracked by your smartphone or tablet
on every single app that uses geolocation, and to a certain extent even
if you have, your device is tracking you. 2 Every time you make a
location request or run many popular apps, your device records where
you are.3 There are no current laws that restrict the possible uses of
1. See infra Part I.C.
2. See infra Part L.A-C.
3. See Daniel lonescu, Geolocation 101: How It Works, the Apps, and Your Privacy, PC
WORLD (Mar. 29, 2010, 7:45 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/192803/geolo.html.
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this information, so the corporations that acquire such information are
at liberty to use it as they see fit.4
This Note argues that Congress should enact a statutory
landscape that would preempt both state and tort regulation in favor
of a uniform protection regime. That regime should inform consumers
of the information being collected, provide consumers the option to
specifically and conveniently opt out of the data collection, and enable
consumers to monitor and delete their geolocation data whenever they
choose. Additionally, this Note suggests that if a company violates its
statutory obligations, it should be subject to civil damages through
class action suits brought by private citizens against infringers. To
support this conclusion, Part I provides a brief introduction to the
mechanics of geolocation tracking and the overarching legal concepts
of privacy. Part II explains why a lack of regulation is concerning and
introduces the two sets of privacy principles that are most prevalent in
the area of consumer privacy law: those of the Federal Trade
Commission and those of the American Institution of Certified Public
Accountants. Part III supplies the elements of a solution built upon
openness to consumers and a strong enforcement mechanism provided
by private class actions. Part IV concludes with an analysis of current
bills under consideration by Congress and a discussion of their
relative strengths and deficiencies.
I. BACKGROUND
Not so long ago, wireless mobile devices simply made and
received phone calls.5 Those simple devices have been replaced by the
modern smartphone,6 as well as the location-enabled tablet,7 which
4. See In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106865, at *9, *46 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue Apple
for collecting and using customers' personal data without the customers' consent or knowledge).
5. Dana B. Rosenfeld & Matthew P. Sullivan, Legal Growing Pains in the Mobile App
Market, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., 13 (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdfl
2011/September/13.pdf.
6. See Smartphone, PCMAG.COM ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.pcmag.comlencyclopedia
(search "smartphone") (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) ("[A smartphone is a] cellular telephone with
built-in applications and Internet access. In addition to digital voice service, modern
smartphones provide text messaging, e-mail, Web browsing, still and video cameras, MP3 player,
and video playback and calling. . . . [S]martphones run myriad free and paid applications,
turning the once single-minded cellphone into a mobile personal computer."); see also Joe
McKendrick, Milestone: More Smartphones than PCs Sold in 2011, SMARTPLANET.COM (Feb. 4,
2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.smartplanet.com/blogfbusiness-brains/milestone-more-smartphones-
than-pcs-sold-in-201 /21828.
7. As the technology that supports the services grows less intrusive and requires less
power from the battery of a device, geolocation services are being integrated into a wide variety
of devices in which they have not previously been seen. See Matthew Schwartz, Anonymous
Hacker Girlfriend Pictures Revealed Much, Police Say, INFORMATIONWEEK SECURITY (Apr. 16,
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today comprise the backbone of a wholly new market based on mobile
applications (apps).8 Many of these apps, as well as the devices on
which they operate, track the user.9
A. Apps and Geolocation-Tracking Utilities
Using mobile apps, consumers can make full use of the
combination of mobile broadband and Web-based content, and mobile
apps represent an area of high growth for the
wireless-telecommunications industry.10  More recently, however,
mobile apps have attracted scrutiny from legislators, regulators, and
the consumer-protection bar due to privacy concerns and claims of
undisclosed charges."
It is possible to ascertain the precise geolocation of individual
devices, and thereby the location of the users to whom the devices
belong, through several technological methods.12 First, all modern
smartphones contain a global positioning system (GPS) chip that
permits the user, on a relatively clear day, to ascertain his location.13
Second, it is possible for network carriers and geolocation apps to
triangulate the location of a mobile device using time-stamped
information broadcast from known cell towers.14  This type of
geolocation system, however, is usually only accurate to
200-1000 meters; thus it serves as a contingency option to the other
geolocation systems.15 The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) requires all telecommunication carriers to provide this service
in order to locate users in the event of an emergency.16  This
2012, 10:50 AM), www.informationweek.com/security/government/anonymous-hacker-girlfriend-
pictures-rev/232900329. These devices now include tablets and cameras and are rapidly
expanding. Id.
8. Rosenfeld & Sullivan, supra note 5.
9. See infra Part I.A-C.
10. Rosenfeld & Sullivan, supra note 5.
11. See, e.g., Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011);
ANN CAVOUKIAN & KIM CAMERON, INFO. & PRIVACY COMM'R OF CANADA, WI-FI POSITIONING
SYSTEMS: BEWARE OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: ISSUES INVOLVING THE UNFORESEEN USES
OF PRE-EXISTING ARCHITECTURE 8 (2011), http://privacybydesign.calcontentl uploads/2011/06/wi-
fi.pdf.
12. Ionescu, supra note 3.
13. See In re United States ex rel. Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831-33
(S.D. Tex. 2010); lonescu, supra note 3.
14. Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 831-33; lonescu, supra note 3.
15. How It Works, SKYHOOK, http://www.skyhookwireless.com/howitworks (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011).
16. See FTC, PUBLIC WORKSHOP: THE MOBILE WIRELESS WEB, DATA SERVICES AND
BEYOND: EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND CONSUMER ISSUES 9 (2002), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
reports/wirelesssummary.pdf; Geoffrey D. Smith, Note, Private Eyes Are Watching You: With the
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technology is growing ever more accurate with the implementation of
microcell base stations and "Location Measurement Units," which
more precisely triangulate a user's geolocation,17 but it remains under
the control of telecommunication carriers.18 A third, newer, and far
more discreet method, however, is that used in the apps created by
Google, Apple, and Skyhook for use in the Android and iPhone
systems,19 the two reigning systems in the smartphone market.20 This
method is called WiFi Positioning System (WPS).21
B. WiFi Positioning System
WPS offers many advantages to mobile devices, leading to a
sharp increase in its implementation in the past few years.22 In urban
areas, satellite-based GPS is much weaker, meaning both that
location finding is more difficult 23 and that GPS places a much heavier
strain on the battery of a mobile device.24 WiFi networks, on the other
hand, tend to be more concentrated and reliable in urban areas,
requiring less battery power to run the system;25 hence, WPS is an
attractive substitute for GPS.2 6 Additionally, using WPS permits
companies such as Apple and Google, who do not have
telecommunication networks of their own, to geolocate.27 Armed with
Implementation of the E-911 Mandate, Who Will Watch Every Move You Make?, 58 FED. COMM.
L.J. 705, 706 (2006).
17. Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. at 833-34.
18. Id. at 834.
19. See Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Apple, Google Collect User Data,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039837045762
77101723453610.html.
20. Rosenfeld & Sullivan, supra note 5.
21. CAVOUKIAN & CAMERON, supra note 11, at 5. Alohar Mobile is currently developing
a fourth method of geolocation that is even more precise than WPS. This new method builds on
the advances of WPS-using GPS systems, WiFi network catalogues, and a device's hardware
(accelerometers, cameras)-in conjunction with an advanced algorithm that deduces a device's
likely location (e.g., if travelling at a walking speed, then the sidewalk; if travelling at a driving
speed, on the roadway). See Rafe Needleman, Cool or Creepy? Alohar Tracks Your Location,
Always, CNET.COM (June 2, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-32973_3-57445927-296.
22. See Rosenfeld & Sullivan, supra note 5.
23. See Skyhook Wireless, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. SUCV2010-03652-BLS2, 2010 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 362, at *2-3 (Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2010); CAVOUKIAN & CAMERON, supra note 11, at
5.
24. CAVOUKIAN & CAMERON, supra note 11, at 5.
25. See How It Works, supra note 15.
26. Id.
27. CAVOUKIAN & CAMERON, supra note 11, at 5.
2013] 717
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
information about the habits and lifestyles of smartphone users, these
companies can more effectively market their products.28
The operation of WPS has two stages.29 First, a company must
index the Media Access Control (1VIAC) address assigned to the real
physical equipment that emits the WiFi network, along with the
associated location of the address.30 Some systems also collect the
Service Set Identifier (SSID) of the router,31 but the SSID is only
sometimes indexed, as a network manager may disable it.32 Second,
the mobile device seeking to identify its location sends out a signal,
receives signals containing MAC addresses from all networks in
range, compiles the information, and sends everything to the WPS
database of the parent company.33 Finally, the WPS database returns
the location of the WiFi networks and, using the known location of the
WiFi networks and their relative signal strengths, the mobile device
calculates its geolocation.34
To make the system work, any geolocation provider must first
compile an index of MAC addresses (and SSIDs) through a process
called "wardriving."35 This process consists of sending a computer,
usually by car, throughout an area in order to probe for WiFi
networks, index the addresses, associate the MAC and SSID with the
specific geographical location, record the signal strength, and finally
upload the information to a central database.36 Google's "street cars"
28. John Terauds, Why Some Traffic Apps Are a Two-Way Street, TORONTO STAR (Sept.
2, 2011), http://www.thestar.com/wheels/article/1048298.
29. Skyhook's system is the prototypical WPS, in part because Skyhook was the first
major company to start wardriving and WPS services, but also because Apple implemented
Skyhook's system in connection with iPhone apps until Apple developed its own system in July
2010. See Who We Are: Company Overview, SKYHOOK, http://www.skyhookwireless.com/
whoweare (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). This Note details Skyhook's processes, but Google and
Apple's systems vary inconsequentially from Skyhook's system. See Spencer E. Ante, Skyhook
Loses a Big Fish-Apple, WALL ST. J. BLOG (July 30, 2010, 9:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
digits/2010/07/30.
30. CAVOUKIAN & CAMERON, supra note 11, at 6.
31. The SSID is a unique ID given to a wireless network. SSID, TECHTERMS.COM,
http://www.techterms.com/definition/ssid (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). It consists of thirty-two
characters and is used to ensure, where multiple wireless devices overlap in a given location,
that data is sent to the correct location. Id.
32. See id.
33. Nils Ole Tippenhauer et al., Attacks on Public WLAN-Based Positioning Systems,
SYs. SEcuRITY GROUP, 2 (2009), http://www.syssec.ethz.ch/research/tippenhauer08attacks. pdf.
34. Id.; see supra note 21 (describing the Alohar system's algorithmic improvement on
WPS).
35. CAVOUKIAN & CAMERON, supra note 11, at 6. Alternatively, a company can simply
buy the database from another company that has already undertaken the "wardriving" process.
See Ante, supra note 29. Prior to creating its own database, Apple purchased technology and
indexes from Skyhook and Google. Id.
36. CAVOUKIAN & CAMERON, supra note 11, at 6.
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were on just such a mission in 2010 when they "inadvertently"
intercepted and recorded information transmitted over unencrypted
networks.37 The information, which Google claims was collected due
to a programming error, included personal information and sensitive
data, such as email addresses and passwords.38
At first glance, Apple and Google's utilization of the WPS
geolocation-tracking system seems harmless.39 The companies are
simply supplying individuals with their locations when they so
desire.40 Recent revelations, however, strongly suggest that Apple's
and Google's systems do not merely provide mobile-device users with
their locations; rather, both operating systems are set to save the
geolocation data of the mobile devices and to transmit the data back to
the respective company's database.41 In other words, both of these
companies have a log of the precise geolocation of a particular device
every time its users make a WPS geolocation request.42
Additionally, a large percentage of the apps running on both
Android and iOS mobile platforms transmit geolocation information to
Google or Apple and to app companies without the customer's
knowledge or consent.43 Even more perturbing, some apps transmit
geolocation information to third-party companies.44 In 2010, the Wall
Street Journal completed a study regarding how frequently such
transmission to third-party companies occurs.45 From a cross section
of 101 apps, including such popular apps as Angry Birds and Pandora,
the Journal discovered that some fifty-six had, without the user's
awareness, transmitted a mobile device's unique ID to other
37. Harry McCracken, Google: The Accidental Spy, PC WORLD (May 14, 2010, 5:35 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/196379; see also Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 19.
38. See Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 19.
39. See Rosenfeld & Sullivan, supra note 5.
40. Id.
41. See Skyhook Wireless, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. SUCV2010-03652-BLS2, 2010 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 362, at *2-4 (Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2010); Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 19.
Android phones determine "location every few seconds and transmit[| the data to Google at least
several times an hour," while the iPhone saves the information in a file that is transmitted to
Apple's servers every twelve hours. Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 19.
42. See Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 19; Andrew Munchbach, Apple
Stealthily Recording, Storing GPS Position of iPhone, 3G iPad Users [Video], BGR.CoM (Apr. 20,
2011), http://www.bgr.com/2011/04/20/apple-recording-storing-gps-position-of-iphone-3g-ipad-
users-video.
43. Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps Are Watching You, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 18, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704694004576020083703574602.
html.
44. See id.; see also Eric Smith, iPhone Applications & Privacy Issues: An Analysis of
Application Transmission of iPhone Unique Device Identifiers (UDIDs), PSKL BLOG (Sept. 30,
2010), http://www.pskl.us/wp/?p=476.
45. Thurm & Kane, supra note 43.
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companies.46 Additionally, the report found that "[fjorty-seven apps
transmitted the phone's location in some way," and "[flive sent age,
gender and other personal details to outsiders."47 Additionally, a
program called Clueful, recently developed by Bitdefender,48 compiled
a cross section of all mobile apps by conducting an audit of
applications running in the memory of iPhones.49 Of the devices that
downloaded the program, Clueful determined that 41 percent of the
apps studied could track users' locations, while 18.6 percent of apps
could access all contact information in the address books of the user
devices.5 0 It seems obvious that, while WPS has many advantages,
with so many apps collecting personal data, the potential for abuse is
considerable.5 '
C. Geolocation Data Uses
Once a company has collected geolocation data, there are two
primary uses for the data, each with its own privacy concerns.52 First,
the collecting company may use the data in-house.53 In-house usage of
private consumer data in order to improve consumer services or
products is a technique already implemented by major players in
today's consumer markets.54  An excellent example is Netflix's
website, which uses the data submitted by the consumer and
information from numerous other consumers, in the form of ratings, to
make recommendations to viewers for future rentals or purchases.5 5
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Clueful was available from the Appstore from May 2012 to July 2012, when Apple
blocked it. Bitdefender relaunched Clueful on August 27, 2012, with new features, this time at no
cost to users. Bitdefender Relaunches Clueful as Free Social Web-Guide on jOS App Behavior,
BITDEFENDER (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.bitdefender.com/news/bitdefender-relaunches-clueful-
as-free-social-web-guide-on-ios-app-behavior-2568.html.
49. Dan Rowinski, Apple Won't Let You See What iPhone Apps Do with Your Data,




52. See discussion infra Part I.C.
53. Amazon, iTunes, Bloglines, NYTimes, and Netflix all utilize customer information to
recommend additional products or services that may be of interest to the customer. Joshua
Porter, Which Movie to Watch? An Overview of Recommendation Systems, BOKARDO BLOG,
http:/Ibokardo.com/archives/quick-overview-of-recommendation-systems (last visited Dec. 20,
2012).
54. Id.
55. Laurie J. Flynn, Like This? You'll Hate That. (Not All Web Recommendations Are
Welcome.), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/23/technology/23
recommend.html; Todd Yellin, More Accurate Star Predictions, NETFLIX U.S. & CANADA BLOG
(May 7, 2009, 2:51 PM), http://blog.netflix.com/2009/05/more-accurate-star-predictions.html.
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The Netflix website recommends roughly two-thirds of all Netflix
rentals. 56
Megacorporations, such as Google and Apple, also collect and
use data derived from WPS.67 Indeed, Google announced on January
24, 2012, that it would begin to track users even more closely and
would be combining the information from across its websites and
services in order to compile a more complete in-house profile of Google
users.58 The changes, complete with changes to Google's privacy
policy for its users, took effect on March 1, 2012.59 Consumers cannot
opt out of these changes.60
Second, and even more of a red flag to privacy advocates and
wary consumers,6' companies sell geolocation data to third-party
companies and individuals.62 These third parties include employers,
banks, marketers, and potentially even law enforcement.63  The
consumer often has no relationship to the third party that purchases
the information, the collecting company never alerts the consumer
that it distributed personal geolocation data to the third party, and
the consumer is unable to determine which company initially
ascertained and sold his personal information to the third party.64
The third party anonymously and surreptitiously purchases what may
be a surprisingly vast amount of information about the consumer.65
The collected information of any one company may be aggregated with
private information possessed by other companies to create a digital
profile of individuals, one that is particularly powerful if it contains
geolocation data.66 For example, in Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma
Stores, Inc., the defendant store used a customer's zip code to perform
56. Flynn, supra note 55.
57. See Cecilia Kang, Google Announces Privacy Changes Across Products; Users Can't





61. Bob Sullivan, Online Privacy Fears Are Real: More People Are Tracking You than
You Think, MSNBC.coM (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078835.
62. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 45-47 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/PO85400behavad
report.pdf [hereinafter SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES].
63. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PERSONAL DATA ECOSYSTEM, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
workshops/privacyroundtables/personalDataEcosystem.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
64. See Sullivan, supra note 61.
65. See id.
66. See Miguel Helft & Tanzina Vega, Seeing That Ad on Every Site? You're Right. It's
Tracking You., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, at B2; see also Kang, supra note 57. The collection of
geolocation data is particularly concerning because it often contains a detailed history about
travel and behavioral patterns. Sullivan, supra note 61.
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a reverse search in an attempt to match her name with her previously
undisclosed addresses.67 The store saved the matched information in
its databases for future use and potential sale to third parties.68 The
California Supreme Court determined that recording customer zip
codes violated the 1971 California Credit Card Act as it constituted
the storing of "personal information."6 9
A company's ability to aggregate data obtained from multiple
sources can be detrimental to consumers. It is possible, for example,
to combine geolocation data with sales receipts to determine a
consumer's preferences, especially when choosing between different
sales outlets, or even between items within a particular store.70
Indeed, the market's push for such a compilation of personal data has
increased dramatically over the past decade due to the vacuum left by
the gradual decline of mass advertising.7' Media companies are under
increasing pressure to attract and target more specific audiences.72 As
there are fewer and fewer "views" or "listens" to particular
advertisements, marketers remaining in the advertising market must
increasingly personalize their advertisements to remain lucrative.73
The use of geolocation data comprises a substantial part of the push of
media companies and app makers to improve their bottom line.7 4
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While this Note will not argue that privacy law should protect
consumers from geolocation data misappropriation, it is imperative to
undertake a brief examination of the history of privacy law in order to
determine why the current privacy-law-based scheme does not
adequately protect consumers.
67. Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612, 615 (Cal. 2011).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 614-15. The California Credit Card Act prohibits such collection of "personal
information," a category the Pineda court declared included zip codes. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82
(West 2012); Pineda, 246 P.3d at 615.
70. It is theoretically possible to track this information, but there is no evidence any
company has done so. This Note merely suggests this as a hypothetical future use for geolocation
data, as more accurate systems are developed. See Needleman, supra note 21.




74. See CAVOUKIAN & CAMERON, supra note 11, at 5.
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A. Warren and Brandeis's "Right to Privacy"
US privacy law traces its origin to the landmark law journal
article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, entitled "The Right to
Privacy," published in the Harvard Law Review.75 Warren and
Brandeis lamented the fact that the instant photograph had the
potential to allow the press to transgress "in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency,"76 allowing an individual's
private life to be on display for all (or at least the highest bidder).77
They defined the right to privacy as the "right to be let alone,"7 8
establishing two foundational rights of privacy: the right of private
individuals to be protected from harmful uses of their private
information and the right of private citizens to be free from
government invasion of privacy.79 The modern framework of privacy
protection derives from these two rights, particularly as relates to the
conceptions of solitude, independence, and personal autonomy.80
B. Tort Regulation of Privacy
Even after Warren and Brandeis's formative work, the
individual is responsible for protecting his privacy,81 either by
preventing others from intruding into his private life or by bringing a
tort claim against an offender.82 The primary framework of legal
sanction, protection, and remedy developed in tort law. 3  Three
private torts emerged in the courtS84: "(1) the tort of unreasonable
intrusion into the seclusion of another, (2) the tort of unreasonable
publicity given to the other's private life, and (3) the tort of publicity
that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public."85
The torts add little protection and are not an effective manner
of protecting consumer privacy in the digital age. The first tort
75. Smith, supra note 16.
76. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
196 (1890).
77. See id. at 195.
78. Id. at 193.
79. Smith, supra note 16, at 708.
80. Id.
81. ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN IN LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE: A WHITE
PAPER FOR REGULATORS, DECISION-MAKERS AND POLICY-MAKERS 7 (2011), available at
http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2011/08/pbd-law-policy.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Smith, supra note 16, at 708.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); see also Phillips v. Smalley Maint.
Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 706 (Ala. 1983).
85. Smith, supra note 16, at 708.
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requires the plaintiff to prove an intrusion of his solitude,86 meaning
that an individual must first have a reasonable expectation of privacy
given the setting and circumstances and that the intrusion must be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.87 But, if an individual is in a
public place where public observation is possible, on a public highway
for example, courts in most cases find no liability.88 The second
tort-that of true statements receiving a level of publicity that would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person and are not of legitimate
public concern-has never been fully resolved with the free-speech
and free-press provisions of the First Amendment.89 The US Supreme
Court has clearly held that information about events that occur within
an individual's home, such as his intimate relations, is actionable if
publicized.90 The problem is that the information must be publicized,
something that rarely, if ever, occurs with geolocation data. The third
tort is, in essence, a stronger version of a defamation claim.91
Defamation is rarely an issue for geolocation data, as there is no
untruth nor is there normally widespread distribution of the
information contained in the data.
C. Protection from Intrusion by the Government
In addition to the right to be protected from harmful uses of
their private information, individuals have the right to be free from
government intrusions.92  Although courts have developed many
factors in determining whether the tracking of citizens is an intrusion,
there are two primary tests formulated by the Supreme Court in Katz
v. United States.93 First, the majority in Katz established an objective
test considering whether the individual had a reasonable expectation
of privacy, given his actions.94  Second, Justice Harlan, in his
concurrence, posited that a better test would include a subjective
element in addition to the objective, asking whether the defendant
exhibited an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy.95 These
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
87. See id. § 652B cmt. a.
88. See id. § 652B cmt. c.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. I; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c.
91. See id. § 652E cmt. b.
92. Fred H. Cate, The Privacy Problem: A Broader View of Information Privacy and the
Costs and Consequences of Protecting It, 4 FIRST REP. 1, 4 (Mar. 2003), http://www.thefreepress.
net[PDF/FirstReport.privacyproblem.pdf; Stephen A. Josey, Note, Along for the Ride: GPS and
the Fourth Amendment, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 161, 164 (2011).
93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
94. Id. at 351.
95. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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two tests, selectively used by subsequent courts, eventually spawned
the Open Fields Doctrine and the limitation on the use of technological
aids in surveilling an individual.96
The Open Fields Doctrine suggests that an individual may not
demand privacy from the government for actions conducted out of
doors (or in the "open fields"), with the exception of conduct in and
around the area of the home.97 In order to receive protection, an
individual must withdraw from the public view into an area where he
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as his home.98
The limitation on the use of certain technological aids creates
an intrusion of privacy if the government utilizes technology to glean
information that it could not have obtained through other legitimate
means.99 For example, in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court
held that a radio beeper hidden on property "withdrawn from the
public view" would be an intrusion of the privacy interests of the home
too great to be sustained under the Fourth Amendment.100 In effect,
the technology would enable the state to enter a realm that it
otherwise could not. 101
Despite the considerable jurisprudence on government use of
geolocation data, none of those cases extend to the private sphere, as
the Fourth Amendment provides protection only against government
actors. As companies are not government actors, Congress must enact
a regulatory scheme that will protect individuals from not only
governmental entities, but also private entities.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The modern wired world has changed the way we behave and
interact considerably, particularly with the advent of geolocation
technologies, as the private sphere has become capable of tracking
individuals in new and novel wayS.10 2 Private companies can now
silently and effortlessly acquire information electronically that
previously only the government could have obtained through a
96. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 706 (1984) (discussing the two
relevant tests); Josey, supra note 92, at 164-66.
97. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (discussing and implementing
the Open Fields Doctrine).
98. See id.
99. Karo, 468 U.S. at 716; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 946-47 (2012).
100. Karo, 468 U.S. at 716; see Josey, supra note 92, at 169.
101. Josey, supra note 92, at 169.
102. Fred H. Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues in Information Privacy, 9 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 61 (2002).
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government investigator persistently tailing an individual.103 The
private sector now has the monitoring capabilities of the government
yet without concomitant Fourth Amendment safeguards.104
A. Consumer Concern Regarding Tracking through Geolocation
Systems
There seems to be a common question voiced by some young
consumers, who are most active on the Internet and therefore most
affected by any abuses105: Why does it matter that companies are
collecting the geolocation data of their customers, particularly when
consumers benefit from technological advances that geolocation
systems bring? The answer: money, power, and misuse. 106
Geolocation information reveals the mobile-device user's work
habits, travel patterns, and precise physical location at any given
moment.107 Over time, market actors can aggregate a comprehensive
profile of a person, and with such information, the market actors gain
great advantage through both use and misuse. One need not be too
creative to imagine the blackmail potential a company with access to
such a profile would hold over the average citizen, much less a board
member for a Fortune-500 company, a judge presiding over a
shareholder suit against a major market actor, or a politician.
Companies such as Google and Apple that acquire geolocation
information could also sell or license the information to third
parties.108 The third party could employ the geolocation data to
advertise directly to the owner of a mobile device based upon the
owner's daily route to work or apparent recreational patterns;
however, the third party's use could also be far less benign. 109 For
example, a sales company could buy the geolocation records for a
salesman of a competing company and then use that information to
recreate the competing company's customer list,110 something that
103. ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING
INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 158 (1999).
104. Id.
105. Press Release, Harris Interactive, Majority Uncomfortable with Websites
Customizing Content Based Visitors Personal Profiles (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.harris
interactive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Majority-Uncomfortable-with-Websites-
Customizing-C-2008-04.pdf [hereinafter Harris Interactive Press Release].
106. See infra notes 108-133 and accompanying text.
107. See supra Part I.A-C.
108. Rosenfeld & Sullivan, supra note 5.
109. See Smith, supra note 16, at 713-14.
110. Id. at 714.
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could be protected as a trade secret.111 Alternatively, an employer
could deny an employment applicant because the employer discovered
through purchased geolocation data that the applicant frequented an
AIDS clinic or perhaps a childcare center in the past few months.112
The amount of private information that would literally be up for sale
to the highest bidder could be considerable.113
Another concern is security of the data.1 1 4 Although Google
and Apple may claim to take the greatest precautions in securing their
data, two recent breaches of security of the Sony PlayStation 3 system,
in which unknown sources obtained considerable online-subscriber
information,115 should give consumers pause. The first hack occurred
in April 2011.116 Criminal hackers accessed sensitive information,
including the credit card numbers, of seventy-seven million
customers.117  Next, in October 2011, hackers infiltrated over
ninety-three thousand accounts.118 Despite heightened security, once
hacked, even a megacorporation like Sony may not be able to keep
sensitive information safe.119  Furthermore, although Google and
Apple would not likely misuse the information, the same may not be
the case for a blackmailer, an individual seeking to quiet minority
political viewpoints, or a stalker.120 Finally, the Sony hack belies the
assumption that information collected but maintained with anonymity
is of little value to a hacker. 121
Despite the great risk and potential for abuse, an increasing
number of major companies are offering services or programs that
111. See Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209, 215-16 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (holding that a customer list was a trade secret under an Illinois statute modeled closely
after the common-law factors).
112. Smith, supra note 16, at 714.
113. See id.
114. Press Release, KPMG, KPMG Survey: U.S. Consumers Believe Mobile Banking Is
Important but Security, Privacy, and Cost Cited as Major Barriers to Mass Adoption (Apr. 8,
2009), http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndlnsights/ArticlesPublications/Press-Releases/
Documents/mobile-banking.pdf [hereinafter KPMG Press Release].
115. Philip Reitinger, An Important Message from Sony's Chief Information Security
Officer, PLAYSTATION.BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011), http:/fblog.us.playstation.com/2011/10/11.
116. Charles Arthur & Keith Stuart, PlayStation Network Users Fear Identity Theft after
Major Data Leak, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2011, 3:59 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
2011/apr/27/playstation-users-identity-theft-data-leak.
117. Id.
118. Reitinger, supra note 115.
119. See id.
120. This is not intended as a critique of Google's, Apple's, or Sony's security measures
but rather to highlight the concern that once data is created, it is at risk of misuse, even when
protected by highly sophisticated companies.
121. See Reitinger, supra note 115.
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utilize geolocation data.122 As these services have become more
prolific, consumers have grown increasingly concerned.123  In one
study undertaken jointly by the University of Pennsylvania and the
University of California-Berkeley, the majority of the participants
wrongly believed that current laws restrict companies from selling
general information about them.124 When asked if there should be a
law requiring websites and advertising companies to delete all stored
information about an individual, if requested to do so, 92 percent of
participants responded affirmatively.1 25  A majority (66 percent)
opposed the use of the information to tailor advertisements to them,
even when told that tracking would occur anonymously.12 6
Additionally, Americans exhibit a lack of trust regarding
privacy and their mobile devices.127 In a study of more than four
thousand smartphone and mobile-device users, KPMG found that
more than 87 percent of US users surveyed harbor concerns about
privacy and security regarding banking on their phones.128 Also, in a
2010 study conducted by Webroot, which surveyed
one-thousand-five-hundred social-network users owning
geolocation-ready devices, 55 percent of the participants expressed
fear regarding a loss of privacy through geolocation apps on their
mobile devices.129 Forty-six percent of the women surveyed were
"highly concerned" about stalkers getting the information,130 and some
45 percent of participants were "highly concerned" about letting a
122. In 2010, Facebook, Twitter, and Google all launched their own "Places" services and
products with features to allow individuals to "check" themselves into a restaurant and discover
content. Janet Jaiswal & Saira Nayak, Location-Aware Mobile Applications: Privacy Concerns &
Best Practices, TRUSTE (2010), http://www.truste.com/pdflLocation-AwareMobileApplications.
pdf. Other popular location-based social-networking services include BrightKite, Foursquare,
Gowalla, Loopt, Whrrl, and Yelp!. Location, Location, Location: A Primer on Location-Based
Social Network Marketing, 41MPRINT.COM (2011), http://info.4imprint.com/wp-content/uploads/
1P-02-0111-Jan-2011-Blue-Paper-Geolocation.pdf.
123. See Joseph Turow et al., Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored
Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It 3 (2009), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/
pdf/business/20090929-TailoredAdvertising.pdf.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. KPMG Press Release, supra note 114.
128. Id.
129. Press Release, Webroot, Webroot Survey Finds Geolocation Apps Prevalent amongst
Mobile Device Users, but 55% Concerned about Loss of Privacy (July 13, 2010),
http://www.webroot.com/EnUS/pr/threat-research/cons/social-networks-mobile-security-
071310.html [hereinafter Webroot Press Release].
130. Josh Halliday, People Worry About Over-Sharing Location from Mobiles, Study
Finds, GUARDIAN TECH. BLOG (July 12, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
blog/2010/jul/12/geolocation-foursquare-gowalla-privacy-concerns.
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potential burglar know when they are away from home.13 1 The high
level of consumer concern likely translates into a loss of sales and a
hesitancy to engage fully and efficiently in market interactions,13 2
particularly among women and older generations.133
B. Absence of Legal Protection and the Winds of Change
Contrary to popular consumer belief,134 current federal law
permits companies, such as Skyhook, Google, Apple, and other app
makers, to collect geolocation data and share it with third parties
without obtaining prior consent from, or even notifying, their
customers.135 This collection and sale are probably not subject to tort
liability 36 because the typical collection and sale of geolocation data is
accomplished without unreasonably intruding on the seclusion of a
customer, without ever publicizing anything, and without the false
portrayal of any information. 137
Fortunately, the winds of consumer protection in the United
States are beginning to shift, if only for Google customers.138 The
change is not the result of US political pressure or threatened
litigation, although such pressure is growing,139 but rather originates
from foreign sources-the German and French governments and an
EU data-protection directive.140 These European governmental actors
131. Webroot Press Release, supra note 129.
132. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy
2000/privacy2000.pdf [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM'N 2000].
133. According to the AARP, "24% of computer users age 45 and over who have never
purchased online cite privacy as the key reason." Id. at 41 n.15 (citation omitted).
134. See Turow et al, supra note 123, at 4.
135. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006).
136. See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106865, at *46 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
137. WPS and GPS tracking do not necessarily intrude on an individual's seclusion, as
the information concerns a person's movements, which often occur on public roads where there is
no reasonable expectation of seclusion. See supra Part II.B. If this information is true and not
put in the public sphere, it may be sold to a third-party advertiser without implicating any
common-law tort. See supra Part II.B.
138. See Cyrus Farivar, Google Bends to European Privacy Worries with WiFi Opt-Out
Plan, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.dw.de/google-bends-to-european-privacy-
worries-with-wifi-opt-out-plan/a-15387075; Kevin J. O'Brien, Google Offers More Privacy to Avert
Clash with E.U., INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lP1-
197631044.html (discussing Google's efforts to avoid potential liability for privacy intrusion
within the European Union).
139. See supra Part II.A.
140. See Farivar, supra note 138; see also Council Directive 2002/58/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and
the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and
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have determined that participation in the collection of consumer
geolocation data must be voluntary.14 1 In response, largely due to the
importance of the European market to Google's Android sales, which
is now the most popular operating system on new cell phone
shipments,142 Google has announced it will create an opt-out option of
geolocation services for WiFi providers worldwide.143 Once a wireless
network host has opted out, Google will not utilize the access point to
determine user locations.144 Apple and other app makers have yet to
make any similar opt-out allowances.
As believed by some privacy advocates, however, Google's
modest changes, even if adopted industry-wide, are insufficient,145
especially given recent statements from Google announcing more
consumer data collection and less consumer choice.146 Although WiFi
providers may deny Google the privilege of using their access point to
geolocate mobile devices, consumers still cannot opt out of geolocation
or data sharing with third parties. 147 The United States, the world's
technology leader and home to both Google and Apple, should do more
to strike a balance between fostering technological advancement and
mitigating unwanted commercial intrusion into the lives of
consumers.
C. Self-Regulation Disclosure Frameworks
A potential solution to the disclosure deficit is an effective and
broad self-regulatory framework. Two such frameworks have been
proposed: the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Fair Information
Practice Principles (FTC Principles) and the Generally Accepted
Privacy Principles, as formulated by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants.
1. FTC Self-Regulation-Disclosure Framework
The FTC has been very active in its attempts to promote
consumer privacy by issuing a series of guidelines for private
Electronic Communications), art. 9, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 45, available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:201:0037:0037:EN:PDF.
141. Farivar, supra note 138.
142. Alexis Santos, IDC: Android Claims 75 Percent of Smartphone Shipments in Q3, 136
Million Handsets Sold, ENGADGET (Nov. 1, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2012/11/
01/android-75-percent-marketshare-136-million-shipped.
143. Farivar, supra note 138.
144. Id.
145. See CAVOUKIAN, supra note 81, at 21 n.60.
146. See Kang, supra note 57.
147. See Farivar, supra note 138.
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companies.148 Some consider § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
to be the best framework in current legislation for addressing privacy
issues. 149 The Act itself empowers the FTC to prohibit "unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."150 Under this
aegis and seemingly drawing from a number of domestic and
international privacy laws,1 51 the FTC has formulated the Fair
Information Practice Principles.152 Within those principles, the FTC
has stressed heightened protection for "personally identifiable
information" (PII),153 which includes "information that can be linked
to a specific individual"154 and encompasses "financial data, data
about children, health information, precise geographic location
information, and Social Security numbers."15 5  These advisory
principles, if followed, promote congruity with international laws
while fostering consumer confidence.
The FTC Principles set forth five main doctrines. The first is
"Notice/Awareness."1 5 6  As mentioned above in the discussion of
tort-regulation effectiveness, consumers cannot make informed
decisions about their consumption practices without notice of the
148. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF REPORT: PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND
POLICYMAKERS 39-78 (2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE].
149. See, e.g., Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The
Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61,
115 (2011).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
151. See FED. TRADE COMM'N 2000, supra note 132; FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY
ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf
[hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM'N 1998]; THE CANADIAN STANDARDS ASS'N, MODEL CODE FOR THE
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION: A NATIONAL STANDARD OF CANADA (1996); INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INFO. POLICY COMM., PRIVACY WORKING GRP., PRIVACY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL
INFORMATION (1995); Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY
AND THE NIL: SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995);
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980); THE PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N,
PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977).
152. PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, supra note 148, at
6-7.
153. SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 62, at 20.
154. Id. at 20 n.47.
155. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
156. PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, supra note 148, at
6-7, 45-47.
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disclosure of their personal information.1 57 The other four principles
are meaningful only to the extent consumers know of the disclosure.15 8
Indeed, studies have repeatedly shown 59 that consumers want to be
informed that companies are collecting their personal data, what kind
of data the companies are collecting (sensitive, anonymized, etc.), how
the companies are collecting it, and what the companies intend to do
with it. 160
Second is "Choice/Consent," which, according to the FTC,
means, "giving consumers options as to how any personal information
collected from them may be used."161 This element of Choice/Consent
most often is related to the use of information beyond that necessary
to complete the transaction and typically takes the form of opt-in or
opt-out.16 2 The FTC does not specify the extent of the option, that is,
whether it would be granular 63 as to each element of privacy or
black-and-white like consumer choice in the market. 164
Third is "Access/Participation." This principle suggests that
collectors of data should grant individuals access to all of their
information, so that each individual can check for completeness and
accuracy.165 The consumers should then be able to augment, correct,
delete, or contest the compiled information.166
Fourth is "Integrity/Security," meaning that collectors of
personal data should take reasonable steps to prevent its
misappropriation. 167 Preventative measures include managerial and
157. See supra Part II.B.
158. PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, supra note 148, at
6-7, 45-47.
159. Julia B. Earp et al., Examining Internet Privacy Policies Within the Context of User
Privacy Values, 52 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 227, 227-37 (2005), available
at http://www4.nesu.edul-jbearp/IEEE TEMPrivacyValues.pdf.
160. Efrim Boritz et al., Do Companies' Online Privacy Policy Disclosures Match
Customer Needs? 3 (Canadian Academic Accounting Assoc. Conference Paper, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1082961.
161. Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last modified Nov. 23, 2012).
162. Id.
163. As used in this note, the term "granular" is intended to refer to the most basic
complete element of a system. A granular opt-out would not provide one blanket option
approving or denying the collection and sharing of consumer information, but would rather
require presentation of the option to opt out of tracking in certain instances. Some examples of
the opt-out options on a granular level would be an opt out at each moment the service is
significantly changed, any time an app begins requesting geolocation information not previously
approved by the consumer, and each and every occasion of sharing geolocation information with
a specified third party.
164. See FED. TRADE COMM'N 2000, supra note 132.
165. Id. at 29-31
166. Id.
167. Id. at 32-33.
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technical procedures, organizational form, technological security
systems, and fail-safes.168 Security should adequately protect data
against breaches, such as those that occurred at Sony. 169
The fifth and final principle is "Enforcement/Redress."170
Enforcement is the key to a successful consumer privacy regime and
has traditionally been the weak link in the privacy chain.171 Self
regulation has been the most common method of enforcement, but to
be meaningful it must be more concrete than mere broad policies.172
Additional civil and criminal penalties are nonexistent.
A congressional statute based upon these five principles that
establishes a cause of action that could be litigated in a class action
suit would constitute the ideal method to protect consumer privacy
and promote consumer confidence. Although admittedly abstract, the
FTC Principles encompass all the crucial elements of an effective
consumer privacy regime. If properly combined in a statutory
landscape with an adequate civil remedy1 73 and a focus on the
provision of notice to consumers, the guidelines would provide the
necessary structure to foster consumer confidence in geolocation-data
collection and sharing.
2. AICPA Self-Regulation Framework
The current self-regulatory framework upheld and voluntarily
followed by many companies is the Generally Accepted Privacy
Principles (GAPP), as formulated by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 174 GAPP follows the five FTC
Principles closely,175 but it does not directly state them; it instead lists
ten principles that companies must follow in order to protect the
privacy of their customers.176 Although fairly well articulated and
structured, the regime has a problem at the point where it is most
168. Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 161.
169. See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
170. Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 161.
171. See id.
172. NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION FOR
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY-DISCUSSION DRAFT (1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/
1998/elements-effective-self-regulation-protection-privacy-discussion-draft.
173. See infra Part I.C.
174. Generally Accepted Privacy Principles, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS
(2009), available at http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/InformationTechnology/Resources/
Privacy/GenerallyAcceptedPrivacyPrinciples (follow "Practitioner Version of GAPP" hyperlink)
[hereinafter GAPP].
175. See id.; see also Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 161.
176. See GAPP, supra note 174, at 7.
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needed: enforcement.7 7 Principle ten, "Monitoring and Enforcement
Criteria," requires a company to enact various monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms so that the company may ensure that it is
properly enforcing its privacy policy,' 78 but the AICPA has no means
of forcing companies to comply with its standard.79 For example,
GAPP requires member companies to have "inquiry, complaint, and
dispute" processes, but GAPP lists no means of punishing a company
if it should choose not to comply or to only partially comply with the
requirements. 180
Recently, critics of GAPP and of self-regulation have become
more outspoken. Indeed, Wired magazine has observed that
self-regulation by the advertising industry has "conspicuously failed to
make the industry more transparent about when, how, and why it
collects data about internet users."181 Several studies lend support to
these statements,182 such as one undertaken by the Berkeley School of
Information.183 In its study, Berkeley found that of twenty-two major
websites184 requesting and collecting geolocation data, none informed
their users upfront that they were doing so, 8 5 and only three
mentioned it in their privacy policies.186 Self-regulation or not, it
seems that more must be done to address geolocation-data-privacy
issues.
D. Opt-in Impossibility
One potential solution is to allow consumers to opt-in rather
than opt-out of data collection. If properly formulated, such a change
would flip the default, making consumer privacy the norm while
forcing companies to request permission to collect geolocation
information in every instance they desire it. The FCC proposed a
177. See id. at 60-65.
178. Id.
179. See id. at iii.
180. Id. at 60-61.
181. Ryan Singel, You Deleted Your Cookies? Think Again, WIRED (Aug. 10, 2009, 7:39
PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2009/08/you-deleted-your-cookies-think-again.
182. PAM DIXON, THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE: FAILING AT CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND AT SELF-REGULATION 39 (2007), available at http://www.worldprivacy
forum.org/pdflWPF_NAIreportNov2_2007fs.pdf; Nick Doty et al., Privacy Issues of the W3C
Geolocation API, UC BERKELEY SCH. OF INFO., 8-10 (Feb. 2010), http://escholarship.orgluc/
item/Orp834wf.
183. See Doty et al., supra note 182, at 8-10.
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similar opt-in solution187 under the authority granted to it by the
Telecommunications Act. 188 The Act sought to prevent
telecommunications carriers from distributing customer proprietary
network information (CPNI) 189 to third parties, "except as required by
law or with approval of the customer."19 0 As a preliminary matter, the
Telecommunications Act offers no protection for consumer geolocation
data, as none of the companies concerned are telecommunications
carriers governed by the Act. 191
The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, hearing a
challenge to the FCC opt-in rule,1 9 2 found the opt-in requirement to be
an unconstitutional restriction on the carrier's free-speech right to
communicate with their customers,19 3 asserting that rules could not be
broader than is necessary to prevent "specific and significant harm" to
individuals. 194 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the
decision,1 9 5 and in response the FCC reversed course by adopting an
opt-out procedure.19 6 Neither Congress nor regulatory agencies have
adopted an opt-in measure since. Although an opt-in technically
remains a possibility, it stands on shaky constitutional grounds.1 9 7
IV. WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION
Congress should bolster self regulation regarding geolocation
data by enacting a statute that codifies self-regulation principles.19 8
187. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999).
188. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006).
189. Id. § 222(h)(1) (defining "customer proprietary network information" as "(A)
information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and
amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a
telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by
virtue of the carrier-customer relationship; and (B) information contained in the bills pertaining
to telephone exchange service or telephone toll service received by a customer of a carrier; except
that such term does not include subscriber list information").
190. Id. § 222(c)(1).
191. See id. § 253. The Act does not cover geolocation data as CPNI because it is other
companies' programs running on a device that ascertain the data, not the carriers. Peter Schaar,




192. U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1230.
193. Id. at 1237-38.
194. Id. at 1235.
195. Competition Policy Inst. v. U.S. West, Inc., 530 U.S. 1213, 1213 (2000).
196. See Implementation of the Telecomms. Act of 1996: Telecomms. Carriers' Use of
Customer Proprietary Network Info. & Other Customer Info., 17 FCC Red. 14860 (2002).
197. See Competition Policy Inst., 530 U.S. at 1213.
198. See supra Part III.C-D.
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Congress should also create a civil remedy for failure to comply,
permitting private individuals to file class action suits for privacy
intrusion. This solution, as explained below, is the best means to both
foster consumer confidence in security of their personal information'99
and to allow growth in the communications sector. It is critical to
protect consumer privacy and assuage consumer concern200 while
allowing creative companies such as Google and Apple to continue to
innovate in the way that has enabled them to rise to the top as
industry and global leaders.201 In other words, it is imperative not to
kill the golden goose, but it is also imperative that private citizens not
be forced under its wing.
A. Openness Is the Key to Consumer Confidence
Openness and free disclosure of information is the best solution
to the current geolocation privacy problem and exactly the solution
which both the FTC Principles and most privacy advocates espouse.202
Open and honest disclosure would permit consumers to make their
own decisions on what is the proper level of privacy for them and
whether a service is worth forgoing their personal privacy. In order
for consumers to make an informed decision regarding the level of
privacy proper for them, companies must present consumers with
clear, understandable information.2 03
199. See supra notes 115-127 and accompanying text.
200. Id.
201. As of market close on February 23, 2012, Google had a market cap of $197.07
billion. Google Inc., GOOGLE FIN. (Feb. 23, 2012, 7:23 PM), http://www.google.com/
finance?q=google. As of market close on February, 23, 2012, Apple had a market cap of $481.47
billion. Apple Inc., GOOGLE FIN. (Feb. 23, 2012, 7:23 PM), http://www.google.com/finance
?q=apple&hl=en.
202. See SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 62, at 46-47.
203. It is ironic that one of the biggest offenders, Google, has historically placed a priority
on disclosure. JEFF JARVIS, WHAT WOULD GOOGLE Do?: REVERSE-ENGINEERING THE FASTEST
GROWING COMPANY IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD 95-98 (2009). Indeed many in the industry
would describe two of the most important themes of Google's success as "Be Honest" and "Be
Open." Id. To be fair, at the time this Note went to press, Google was undertaking some
measures and making some concessions that most of its competitors were unwilling to make, an
example being the aforementioned implementation of an opt-out. See O'Brien, supra note 138
(noting the efforts of Google to avoid potential liability for privacy intrusion within the European
Union); see also Farivar, supra note 138. Google has a willingness to frankly admit imperfection,
and a culture that promotes openness and disclosure. Matt Cutts, Google Search and Search
Engine Spam, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan 21, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2011/01/google-search-and-search-engine-spam.html ("We take pride in Google search and strive
to make each and every search perfect. The fact is that we're not perfect, and combined with
users' skyrocketing expectations of Google, these imperfections get magnified in perception.
However, we can and should do better."(emphasis added)). Google's open model has not only
worked well, it has propelled Google to the top of almost every niche it has chosen to enter. To be
fair to Google's efforts, Google has created a program entitled "Dashboard" that permits a user to
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B. Adding Incentive to the Self-Regulatory Regime
Self-regulation, as currently implemented, is insufficient; a
system that implements the principles of the AICPA and FTC and
punishes noncompliant companies via a civil penalty is the best
solution.204 Congress should create a privacy floor-a level of privacy
that consumers cannot unwittingly give away. Additionally, Congress
should require companies to attain informed consent at the granular
level, and Congress should place strict limits on companies that seek
geolocation data.205 Such a system would bolster consumer confidence
in the privacy of geolocation data while also requiring companies to
protect consumer privacy or face penalties. In order to reach this goal,
Congress should establish a precise set of guidelines for consumer
privacy, add more specifies to the principles formulated by the FTC2 06
or by the AICPA, 207 and create a private cause of action that would
foster a class action enforcement regime.
Indeed, the FTC Principles, if properly enforced, would
sufficiently increase consumer confidence in their right to privacy. In
a study conducted in 2008 by Dr. Alan Westin in collaboration with
Harris Interactive, Westin found that 59 percent of participants were
uncomfortable with "websites us[ing] information about [their] online
activity to tailor advertisements or content to [their] hobbies and
interests."208 But when Westin described to participants actions by
the websites that would comply with the first four FTC principles,
Westin found that most people, apart from the over-sixty-three age
bracket, were comfortable with such actions, particularly with
companies using online activities to customize advertisements.2 09
Although the survey related to online information in general and not
solely geolocation information,210 physical location is just as personal
see and, to an extent, manage the data associated with a user account. Privacy Tools,
GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/privacy/tools.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). To log into
your Dashboard account and view your personal data, visit https://www.google.com/dashboard.
Apple typically takes the opposite approach, providing fewer options and less openness in the
majority of its products. Still, despite the obvious success of its openness approach in other areas,
Google has made only small steps toward implementing broad policies of openness regarding
geolocation data. See supra Part I.
204. See supra Part III.C-D.
205. See SHAPIRO, supra note 103, at 220 (stating the necessity of a privacy safety net
that protects consumers from their own impulses to trade away too much information on a
competitive private market for consumer privacy).
206. See Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 161.
207. See GAPP, supra note 174, at 7.
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and deserving of privacy, if not more so, than an individual's digital
profile.
Ultimately, companies must notify consumers of data collection
before it occurs.211 Consumers must receive information regarding
who is doing the collecting, for what purpose, what security measures
the collector is taking, and with or to whom the collector may or may
not share or sell the data.212 Also, consumers must be able to opt-out
of specific data elements on the granular level, not simply affirm or
deny a request for data to be collected generally, meaning that
consumers should be able to prohibit the sharing of information with
all third-party companies.213 Consumers must be able to access their
information, correct any incorrect data, or delete any and all
information, meaning that each company must have an app or website
comprehensively structured so as to permit the average consumer to
be able to delete any information stored by the company. For this to
be possible, once the consumer deletes the information, the collecting
company must also permanently delete the data, as must any of the
affiliates with whom the collecting company has shared the data.
C. Civil Award
In order to properly strike the balance between sufficiently
incentivizing business and unduly burdening the burgeoning
geolocation industry, this Note recommends Congress create a civil
award214 to accompany the statutory enactment of the FTC
Principles.2 1 5  The award should be substantial enough that
companies as large as Google will have a strong disincentive to violate
consumer privacy but small enough that it should not bankrupt a
small apps company. The proper balance would be a fine of between
$15,000 and $40,000 per consumer who falls victim to geolocation data
misappropriation.2 16 To prevail, the plaintiff must show: (1) the
collecting company appropriated his geolocation information without
his knowledge or consent, (2) the company stored the geolocation
211. See Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 161.
212. These suggestions closely follow the first four categories of the FTC Principles. See
SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 62.
213. See Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 161.
214. A criminal remedy would be necessary in order to address stalking and extortion
concerns related to geolocation information, but a full inspection of a criminal remedy-its scope,
magnitude, and prospects for effectiveness-are outside the scope of this Note. See Location
Privacy Protection Act of 2011, S. 1223, 112th Cong. § 2266 (2011) (addressing the use of
geological information in instances of stalking and domestic violence).
215. See Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 161.
216. Cf. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. § 404 (2011)
(establishing a maximum remedy of $16,500 per day of infraction).
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information, and (3) the collecting company either employed the
geolocation information to sell its goods or the collecting company sold
the geolocation information to a third-party company. The
congressional statute should establish a specific award amount, so as
to avoid complicated lawsuits and extensive jury findings regarding
statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages.217
It is imperative that Congress construct the statute in such a
fashion so as to easily permit class certification, thereby allowing
private citizens to serve as the primary enforcement mechanism.
Fifteen thousand dollars in remedy may be enough to motivate some
individuals to bring suit apart from a class, but it would not likely be
worth the challenge of confronting large corporations in what could be
an expensive litigation battle, particularly not when others would
likely be watching and waiting to bring similar suits. Also, only a few
claims of $15,000 each are not enough to serve as a strong deterrent to
major companies, particularly companies such as Google and Apple,
with market caps of $197.07 billion 218 and $481.47 billion, 219
respectively.
But if each claimant has a claim potentially worth $15,000 and
claimants are able to sue as a class, it would force companies, even
those as large as Apple, to change their privacy policies. If, for
example, there were two million claimants,220 a defendant would
potentially be liable for upwards of $30 billion in damages. Such a
sum would unavoidably give app makers and
smartphone-operating-system creators the necessary incentive to
217. Statutory damages are available in other areas of law dealing with more abstract
rights such as trademark and copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).
Although statutory damages are not the sole remedy in intellectual property law, this Note
posits that making statutory damages the sole remedy for geolocation privacy violations is ideal
because privacy violations result in little monetary harm and a factual inquiry into the damages
to each victim would prove protracted and unpredictable. For a more comprehensive examination
of the effectiveness of statutory damages in copyright law, see R. Collins Kilgore, Sneering at the
Law: An Argument for Punitive Damages in Copyright, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 637 (2013).
218. As of market close on February 23, 2012, Google has issued 325.14 million shares
with a trading value of $606.11 per share. Google Inc., GOOGLE FIN., http://www.google.com/
finance?q=google (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
219. As of market close on February 23, 2012, Apple has issued 932.37 million shares
with a trading value of $516.39 per share. Apple Inc., GOOGLE FIN., http://www.google.com/
finance?q=apple&hl=en (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
220. Two million is only 1 percent of the current number of Gmail accounts, which as of
November 2010, was 193 million accounts worldwide. Joshua Norman, "Gmail Killer" from
Facebook on Its Way?, CBSNEWS.COM (Nov. 15, 2010, 11:15 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
501465_162-20022793-501465.html. Setting the remedy between $15,000 and $40,000 per
consumer seems reasonable given that Apple sold 18.65 million iPhones from January to March
2011 alone. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, How Many iPhones Did Apple Sell Last Quarter?, CNNMONEY
(July 13, 2011, 5:41 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/07/13/how-many-iphones-did-apple-
sell-last-quarter-2.
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respect a consumer-privacy statute. Both major players and minor
app producers alike would comply with the federal law. Thus, a class
action would be a powerful deterrent.
The bad press and negative image created by a successful suit
for geolocation privacy breach against even a large tech company like
Google, which relies heavily on stock options for employee
motivation,221 would be a significant deterrent in its own right. A drop
in stock price could result in repercussions within a company's labor
force, potentially leading to drastic measures similar to 2009, when
the huge drop in the market forced Google to reprice its employee
stock options.222
Lastly, a reward of at least $15,000 is likely to be a large
enough sum to give the lead plaintiff a strong incentive to monitor the
actions of the plaintiffs' counsel, a relationship upon which other
private class-action regimes have placed great emphasis in order to
ensure the regime functions properly.223
D. Class Action Enforcement
It is not within the scope of this Note to weigh every ancillary
element of a class action system of enforcement.224 Changes in class
action rules may bring some level of uncertainty to the class action
enforcement regime; however, if Congress were to model the class
action regime on Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,2 2 5 it
221. See Lewis D. Lowenfels et al., Attorneys as Gatekeepers: SEC Actions Against
Lawyers in the Age of Sarbanes-Oxley, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 877, 901-05 (2006); Katie Hafner,
Google Options Make Masseuse a Multimillionaire, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2007), http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/11/12/technology/12google.html.
222. In early 2009, Google had seventeen thousand employees holding more than eight
million stock options, which it reset to a lower price to benefit and continue to incentivize its
employees. Google Reprices Employee Stock Options, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009, 1:43 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/23/business/main4750463.shtml.
223. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 222-26 (3d Cir. 2001); STEPHEN J.
CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CASES AND ANALYSIS 238 (Robert C. Clark et
al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (discussing the lack of incentive for plaintiffs in securities-fraud class
actions to adequately monitor plaintiffs' counsel when the lead plaintiff stands to gain only a
trivial sum). The intricacies of plaintiffs' counsel theory is beyond the scope of this Note.
224. Nor is it within the scope of this Note to analyze the impact on class actions of
Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), a case that potentially changed the rules for
certification of a class. See id. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes involved a class action suit for sexual
discrimination based on Wal-Mart's alleged practice of promoting men rather than women to
management positions. Id. at 2547. The Supreme Court dismissed the case, holding in part that
the class could not be certified because it did not satisfy the commonality requirement. Id. at
2556-57. The Court's holding arguably tweaked the Rule 23 commonality requirement, but any
such change is unlikely to impact a finding of commonality as proposed in the solution of this
Note.
225. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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would likely prove highly effective at protecting consumer privacy
regarding geolocation data. While class action enforcement is already
available under the current tort model, the current scheme provides
little protection to consumers, because the selling of personal
geolocation data to third parties generally does not violate any tort.
Additionally, any creation of a new tort by a court would likely occur
in chaotic and piecemeal fashion, a manner that characterizes
court-made common law.
1. Jurisdiction
Class action plaintiffs may bring class action claims in federal
court if their claims arise under federal law 2 2 6 or if their claims qualify
for diversity jurisdiction under the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d).227 Section 1332(d) makes diversity jurisdiction contingent
upon the amount in controversy exceeding $5 million 228 and the
plaintiffs satisfying any one of the typical diversity jurisdiction
requirements.22 9 As it would be a far better solution for Congress to
create a uniform body of law rather than allowing a patchwork of state
legislation,230  class action plaintiffs under a federal
consumer-geolocation-data-privacy bill would qualify for federal
question jurisdiction.
2. Class Action Certification
Courts would likely certify a geolocation privacy suit as a class
action under Rule 23.231 The privacy breach would be the primary
claim of all of the plaintiffs, particularly if the court sanctioned a
remedy of $15,000, thereby satisfying the "predominance" or
226. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
227. Id. § 1332(d).
228. Id. § 1332(d)(2).
229. Section 1332(d)(2) sets forth grounds for diversity jurisdiction based on citizenship:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is a class action in which-
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a
foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a
foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A)-(C).
230. See discussion infra Part IV.E.iii.
231. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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"superiority" requirement.232  Although it is difficult to definitively
state all of the claims that members of a putative class action could
raise, as most privacy claims lack standing,233 it seems reasonable
that the privacy claim sanctioned by Congress's newly enacted
geolocation-privacy law would predominate the litigation or, indeed,
be the only claim not dismissed for lack of standing of the collective
plaintiffs. Courts consider efficiency and judicial economy when
considering whether to certify a class,234 and a court would likely find
that it is far more economic and efficient to decide one suit alleging
the same factual pattern and raising the same predominate claim,
rather than thousands or millions of individual suits.235
E. Advantages over Other Regimes
A class action-based enforcement regime has advantages over
other available regimes. These advantages include avoidance of
(1) agency capture, (2) a burdensome and inefficient tort regime, and
(3) a state patchwork of regulation.
232. Id. at 23(b)(3) ("[A class action may be maintained if] questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.").
233. See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106865, at *46 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
234. 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.25 (4th ed. 2002)
(explaining that the predominance test "asks whether a class suit for the unitary adjudication of
common issues is economical and efficient in the context of all of the issues in the suit").
235. A class action suit for breach of disclosure of geolocation information would also be
able to satisfy the five requirements of sustaining a class action in federal courts. First, the class
would satisfy the ascertainability clause, as having their data acquired, stored, and sold without
their consent serves as "objective criteria" allowing a court to identify class members. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B) ("An order that certifies a class action must define the class . . . ."); In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating
that an "identifiable class exists" if members can be ascertained by reference to "objective
criteria" and it is "administratively feasible" for a court to determine). Second, the class would
satisfy the numerosity requirement by including enough plaintiffs to make joinder
"impracticable." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1). Courts interpret impracticable to mean making joinder
difficult or inconvenient, not impossible. See Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993)
("Impracticable does not mean impossible."). Third, the class would satisfy the commonality
requirement by having a "question of law common to the class," FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2), meaning
a similar claim centering on a fact or law whose resolution "is central to the validity of each"
class member's claim. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011). Fourth, the
class would satisfy the adequacy requirement, given that finding a consumer who fairly and
adequately represents the interests of the class would not be difficult. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(a)(4).
Fifth, the privacy violation claim would be "typical" of the claims of the class, as each member's
claim would arise from the same course of events. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(3); Marisol A. v.
Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997).
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1. Avoidance of Agency Capture
Geolocation touches upon a complex area of the law that is
plagued by a rate of technological advancement paralleled in few other
fields. While some would argue that a regulatory agency is a better
candidate for enforcement,236 a class action regime avoids many of the
drawbacks that would arise with a regulatory regime.
First, a class action enforcement regime eliminates any risk of
administrative capture,237 which refers to interest groups or market
actors exerting a "capturing" influence on the staff or commission
members of a regulatory agency, typically leading to the
implementation of the preferred policy outcomes of special interest
groups.238 Administrative capture is not new to economists and is
sometimes the result of the simple fact that highly organized
businesses have better information on what is occurring in a
particular market than do regulatory agencies.239  Alternatively,
regulated companies also have a much higher incentive to lobby
regulators than do citizens, whose interests are quite diffuse in
comparison.240
Second, a class action regime would prevent the delays and
substantial inefficiencies that accompany any regime managed by a
regulatory agency.241 Agencies have little incentive to work quickly
and effectively when formulating regulations, and indeed individuals
have used class action suits in order to sidestep an ineffective
regulatory regime in multiple instances.242 While there may be some
transaction costs to a private-enforcement regime, if judges are active
in the pleading process, the aggregate costs associated with dismissing
frivolous claims are not likely to be higher than the costs of employing
regulators.
236. See SHAPIRO, supra note 103, at 221.
237. The concept described by administrative capture has many names, including agency
capture and regulatory capture.
238. See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sol. 3 (1971).
239. Id.; see Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence
of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 417 (2007); Wendy E. Wagner,
Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1334 (2010).
240. See, e.g., Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, To Regulate, Litigate, or Both 5 (RAND
Inst. for Civil Justice, Working Paper No. WR-677-ICJ, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1450425.
241. For an analysis of environment regulatory agencies' inefficiencies, see STEVEN C.
HACKETT, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES ECONOMICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND THE
SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 105 (3d ed. 1998).
242. See Joni Hersch, Breast Implants: Regulation, Litigation, and Science, in
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 144, 176 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
7432013]
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
The biggest critique against a class action regime is that it
creates heavy reactive regulation, rather than preventive
regulation.243 While it is true that a violation of geolocation privacy
must predicate a suit, under a strong class action regime with an
adequate remedy, companies will have a robust incentive to avoid
violations. A successful suit will be very costly, and industries will
choose to self-regulate in order to avoid the courtroom.
2. Avoidance of Tort Inadequacies
A class action regime built upon a statute passed by Congress
is superior to the adoption of a new common-law tort. Even if
established by the courts, a tort regime would place a single individual
tracked by WPS software at a huge bargaining disadvantage as
compared to a highly centralized corporation tracking the person's
whereabouts for profit-making purposes. While a judge-made tort for
privacy intrusion using geolocation data could experience success, it
would require judges to take a huge step in adopting a new law.
In a tort regime, regulation would be reactive,244 meaning the
law would develop slowly and consumer protection would develop even
more slowly. With the amount of time that it sometimes takes for
cases to wind their way through the courts,245 a vast amount of
information on consumers could already be generated, collected,
utilized, sold to third parties, and even stolen. Thus, private
companies could compromise consumer privacy while waiting for the
common law to develop.
A tort-based system would result in a hodgepodge of regulation
based on court decisions.246 Although judges would also be deciding
class actions, a congressional statute would limit the disagreements
that different judges may have over the political or theoretical
framework of the tort regime. A congressional statute would create
the framework with much of the necessary theory and policy therein,
theoretically obviating this responsibility.
Finally, a tort system would fail to resolve the collective-action
dilemma, meaning individuals would need to bring suit against Apple
243. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 75-88 (2008) (discussing how securities class actions serve as a
check against agency capture and provide important pragmatic benefits to society).
244. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2007) (discussing the reactive nature of common-law tort regulation in the area
of environmental law).
245. For example, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), was filed December
3, 2001, and decided after the appeals process on June 20, 2011. Id.
246. See Somes v. United Airlines, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82 (D. Mass. 1999) (discussing
how state tort law created a patchwork of regulation governing the airline industry).
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or Google alone while all others look on, hoping for a verdict they can
use in future suits.2 4 7 Class actions, on the other hand, avoid this
problem; they permit easy collectivization and are more like business
deals than adversarial litigation.248
3. Avoidance of a State Patchwork
A final option for enforcement is to leave regulation to the
states, and indeed both Utah and California have recently initiated
regulation.249 A state-based regulatory scheme would have many
disadvantages as compared to a federal class action solution. A state
system would be decentralized, increasing compliance costs for
businesses that span multiple jurisdictions. For example, while a
company may be able to collect information from a consumer in
Arizona, it may be unable to do so if the consumer then drives across
the California border.250 This patchwork would be unnecessarily
cumbersome and inefficient for companies.251 Ultimately, consumer
confidence and privacy are necessary, regardless of the state of
residence.252
F. Limits to a Statutory Solution
The statutory scheme should be narrow in order to delicately
balance the needs of multiple areas.253 For example, a consumer
opt-out provision that places consumers in a position to choose
whether or not an app can see their location would cause problems for
247. See supra Part IV.C-D.
248. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J.
371, 418-32 (2001) (discussing how class actions provide the basis for a new model of US
adjudication premised on dealmaking and transactional principles).
249. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-37-201 (West 2012).
250. See supra Part IV.E.2.
251. The right of publicity is an example of a laborious, time-consuming area of
regulation that has been left to the states. See Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a Federal
Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary, 28 COMM. LAW. 14, 16-17 (2011); see also Talor Bearman,
Note, Intercepting Licensing Rights: Why College Athletes Need a Right of Publicity, 15 VAND J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 85, 88 (2012).
252. Another argument against a state regulatory system is that it would incentivize
plaintiffs to forum shop, choosing a state or federal jurisdiction depending on which one is more
plaintiff-friendly. As there is little evidence that any such proclivity exists, the argument need
not be addressed here.
253. See King, supra note 149, at 115 (discussing how limitation on personal jurisdiction,
like those on state action, should consider the "costs associated with an effective geolocation
mandate, the relevance of geography to the underlying online conduct, and the burden on
protected speech").
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apps subject to direct or indirect geolocation mandates.254 For those
apps, the creators must be able to ascertain the geolocation of the user
in order to effectively regulate access to sensitive or illegal content.255
A statute that denies all geolocation information to certain app
companies would make it impossible for them to comply with the
variances of laws across multiple states in a state-based system.256
Still, it would be possible to permit websites to geolocate only as
necessary to comply with any independent legal obligation or to avoid
liability in a jurisdiction. 257
V. BILLS CURRENTLY UNDER CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION
Due to the pressure of constituents, the outcry of privacy
advocates, and the concern of businesses that fear the regulating away
of a very profitable and promising market, Congress has begun
considering a series of bills that either directly or tangentially deal
with the issue of geolocation. This Part briefly discusses the three
most promising bills and concludes with a brief overview of the other
candidates.
A. Location Privacy Protection Act
In June of 2011, Senators Al Franken (D-MN) and Richard
Blumenthal (D-CT) 258 introduced the most promising bill of all
currently under consideration, the Location Privacy Protection Act
(LPPA). 259 Since referral of the LPPA to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary,260 six other senators have agreed to cosponsor the bill. 2 6 1
Under the LPPA, a nongovernmental agency engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce that provides an electronic communication service to
"electronic communication devices" would need to receive express
authorization from the consumer in order to knowingly collect, receive,
254. Most of these apps are online-gambling websites that are regulated in some
jurisdictions but not others. See id. at 115, 122.
255. See id. at 122.
256. See id. at 123.
257. See id. at 114.
258. Daren M. Orzechowski et al., Federal Legislation Introduced Regarding Geolocation
Information, WHITE & CASE (Sept. 2011), http://www.whitecase.com/articles-09162011.
259. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011, S. 1223, 112th Cong. § 2266 (2011) (stating
the purpose of the bill was "[t]o address voluntary location tracking of electronic communications
devices, and for other purposes").
260. Location Privacy Protection Act Bill Summary & Status, Library of Congress
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record, obtain, or disclose to a nongovernmental individual or entity
the geolocation information from an electronic communication.2 62
Express authorization requires that the device owner give affirmative
consent following "clear and prominent notice."2 6 3  The
nongovernmental agency must notify the consumer as to what
geolocation information the agency will collect and the specific
nongovernmental entities that may become privy to the
information. 264
The LPPA definition of "electronic communication device" is
broader than necessary for the area of the law this Note considers, as
the definition is broad enough to encompass issues of consumer online
privacy.265 The bill sweeps all mobile devices under its strictures,
including smartphones, mobile phones, tablets, WiFi-equipped
laptops, GPS navigation units, and most other mobile devices that
permit geolocation.266 It also supersedes any noncomplying state or
local laws.2 6 7
One element of the bill that could quash most
private-enforcement actions is the bill's empowerment of the US
Attorney General and the state attorneys general to bring actions
against violators.268 In order to avoid the common issue of parallel
regimes of private enforcement and administrative enforcement,269 the
bill specifies that if the US Attorney General brings suit, citizens may
not bring private actions while the litigation is pending.270 While it is
possible the preemption clause would prevent the problems relating to
exclusive private enforcement or simultaneous private and
government enforcement actions, the Attorney General may not be as
zealous in his representation as would private citizens who have
actually suffered the harm.271
262. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 § 2713(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1).
263. Id. § 2713(a)(3) (defining "clear and prominent notice" as requiring a display "by the
electronic communications device, separate and apart from any final end user license agreement,
privacy policy, terms of use page, or similar document").
264. Id. § 2713(a)(3)(B).
265. See id. § 2713(a)(2), (b)(1). Privacy issues concerning geolocation data are distinct
from those affecting online consumer data, as geolocation data deals with the concrete physical
location of users rather than their virtual reality.
266. See id.
267. Id. § 2713(e)(1).
268. Id. § 2713(d)(1)-(2).
269. See Helland & Klick, supra note 240, at 68.
270. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 § 2713(d)(4)(A).
271. The Attorney General suffers from many of the same capture problems as
regulatory agencies. See supra Part IV.E.1.
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A major deficiency of the statute is the civil damage award of
only $2,500 and the allowance of punitive damages.272 This sum is too
low, as it would discourage strong lead-plaintiff participation.
Plaintiffs would gain little after a victory, particularly after attorneys'
fees reduce the damage award.273 The possibility of punitive
damages274 creates far less certainty as to the stakes of the claim,
adding further inefficiency and expense to the enforcement
mechanism. Additionally, $2,500 in damages would require at least
two thousand plaintiffs to be able to clear the Rule 23 damages hurdle
for class certification, meaning courts will refuse to certify some
meritorious suits due to the small number of plaintiffs bringing claims
against small infringers.275
B. Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act
Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) and Senator Ron Wyden
(D-OR) introduced the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act2 76
(GPS Act) in June of 2011,277 and it has since been offered as an
amendment o the Cybersecurity Act of 2012.278 The GPS Act, like the
LPPA, prohibits the interception and collection of consumer
geolocation data without primary consumer consent.279 The GPS Act,
however, attempts to include governmental actors in addition to
nongovernmental actors,280  thereby addressing the Fourth
Amendment issues surrounding governmental use of consumer citizen
geolocation data.281 While it is outside the scope of this Note to
analyze the bill in light of the recent Supreme Court ruling of United
272. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 § 2713(d)(5)(A)-(B).
273. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study 20 tbl.1 (NYU Ctr. for Law and Bus., Working Paper No.
CLB-03-017, 2003) (finding that the average attorney fee in private class actions was 21.9
percent and the median was 23.2 percent, far below the oft-quoted one-third).
274. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 § 2713(d)(5)(B).
275. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; supra Part IV.D.2.
276. Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 1212, 112th Cong. § 2602 (2011).
277. Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act Bill Summary & Status, Library of
Congress THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov (select "bill number" and search "S.1212") (last visited
Oct. 27, 2012).
278. Press Release, Ron Wyden, Senator for Oregon, Wyden Amendments to Cyber Bill
Clarify Rules for GPS Tracking; Seek Privacy Protection in the Cloud (July 31, 2012),
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-amendments-to-cyber-bill-clarify-rules-
for-gps-tracking-seek-privacy-protection-in-the-cloud-.
279. See Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act § 2602(a). This Note analyzes the
Senate version (S. 1212), as the House version (H.R. 2168) is substantially similar.
280. Id. § 2601(8).
281. See supra Part II.C.
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States v. Jones,282 in regards to private actors the GPS Act falls short
in its privacy protection as it contains no provisions regarding how
consent is to be given or received.283
In addition, the bill's enforcement mechanism is grossly
inadequate.284 The GPS Act adopts a private cause of action against
parties other than the United States engaged in the interception,
disclosure, and intentional use of geolocation data.28 5 In addition to
punitive damages, the victims are eligible for the greater of (1) the
sum of actual damages suffered plus the profits made by the violator
as a result of the violation, or (2) statutory damages of whichever is
the greater of $100 per day the violation occurred or $10,000.286 In
addition to having many of the same problems as the LPPA, the GPS
Act's complicated and small remedy renders class actions nearly
impossible.287 This may mean an increase in individual suits brought,
or it may mean that consumers bring virtually no actions-neither
class nor individual. Also, the possibility of punitive damages,
statutory damages, and actual damages plus profits will cause the
regime to be very cumbersome, opaque, and ineffective.2 88
C. Mobile Device Privacy Act
Representative Ed Markey (D-MA) recently introduced the
Mobile Device Privacy Act to the House of Representatives on
September 12, 2012.289 The bill will require that any entity that sells
a mobile device, a mobile service, or offers an app for download must
provide "clear and conspicuous disclosure"290 to consumers as required
by yet-to-be-promulgated FTC rules.291  Such disclosure must
specifically include that an app or company has installed a particular
monitoring software, what type of information the app or program is
monitoring and transmitting, with whom the collector might share the
information, how the collector and third parties will use the
282. United States v. Jones recently held that the placement of a tracking device on a car
that transmitted geolocation data for twenty-eight days was a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 954 (2012).
283. See Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act §§ 2601-2602.
284. See id. § 2605.
285. Id. § 2605(a).
286. Id. § 2605(b)(2), (c).
287. See supra Part IV.C.1.
288. See supra Part IV.C.
289. Wendy Davis, Lawmaker Proposes New Privacy Safeguards for Mobile Users,
ONLINE MEDIA DAILY (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:55 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/
182903.
290. Mobile Device Privacy Act, H.R. 6377, 112th Cong. § 2(a), (c) (2012).
291. See id. § 2(a).
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information, and what the consumer can do to prohibit further
collection, even if they have provided permission in the past.2 9 2 The
collector must obtain consumer consent prior to the time when the
monitoring software first begins collecting and transmitting
information and must also permit the consumer to revoke consent at a
later date.2 93 Also, the bill requires the collecting companies to add
security measures in order to better protect consumer information.294
The FTC and FCC enforce all requirements,29 5 but the state
attorneys general296 and a private cause of action worth up to $1,000
and attorneys' feeS2 9 7 are alternative means sanctioned by the bill to
protect the disclosure requirement specifically.
Although certainly the closest to a proper and useful solution to
this complicated issue, there are still several very critical
shortcomings. First, the disclaimer is too general; few, if any,
consumers will read or fully understand when they first begin using
the services or product collecting their personal data. It lacks
sufficient granularity in consent; it also lacks a blanket opt-out when
first using the program or service. In addition, although this bill does
include a structure for a private remedy, the state attorneys general
can preempt these suits. These private remedies are too small at only
$1,000 per claim. Taken together, the bill lacks the private-
enforcement mechanism necessary to avoid the risks and inefficiencies
discussed above.298
D. Other Contenders
There are several other bills introduced in Congress, but all are
insufficient to address the implicit concerns of
consumer-geolocation-data privacy. The Commercial Privacy Bill of
Rights Act of 2011 proposes an excellent statutory framework for both
online and geolocation privacy,299 suggests a remedy of $16,500 per
day of infraction,300 and properly preempts state law.30 1 The bill
includes opt-in provisions that are constitutionally suspect,302
292. See id. § 2(b).
293. See id. § 3.
294. See id. § 4(a).
295. See id. § 6.
296. See id. § 6(d).
297. See id. § 6(e).
298. See supra Part IV.E.1.
299. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. § 3(5) (2011).
300. See id. § 404(a).
301. See id. § 405(a).
302. See id. § 202(a)(3); U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999).
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however, and it empowers the FTC to take the leading role in
rulemaking and enforcement.303 Such a solution would likely eclipse
any class action-based regulation and would result in all of the risks
and inefficiencies that come with a regulatory regime.304
Another contender, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Amendments Act of 2011, introduced by Senator Leahy (D-VT),
addresses only governmental actors and their intrusion on citizen
privacy.305 The Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, introduced by
Senator Rockefeller (D-WV), also delegates the FTC full rulemaking
power in order to solve the problem.306 Besides the fact that the bill
attempts to address all Internet privacy concerns along with
geolocation concerns, the bill prescribes a weak civil penalty,
permitting a maximum liability of $15 million per company307-a drop
in the bucket for companies the size of Google and Apple. These bills
are clearly insufficient as regulatory structures of consumer privacy.
Congress should enact a statute creating a framework that
requires companies to notify consumers of data collection before it
occurs.308 A collecting company must inform consumers that the
company is collecting data, for what purpose, what security measures
the collecting company is taking to protect the data, and with whom
the company may or may not share or sell the data.309  Also,
consumers must be able to opt out of specific data elements on the
granular level, not simply affirm or deny a request for data to be
collected generally, meaning that consumers should be able to prohibit
the sharing of information with all third-party companies.310
Consumers must be able to access their information, correct any
incorrect data, or delete any and all information, meaning that each
company must have an app or website comprehensively structured to
permit the average consumer to be able to delete any information
stored by the company. Congress should create a federal class action
regime, allowing $15,000 per successful claim of geolocation data
misappropriation.
303. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011 § 402.
304. See supra Part IV.E.1.
305. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th
Cong. § 2713 (2011).
306. Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2011) ("[The
Do-Not-Track Online Act] require[s] the Federal Trade Commission to prescribe regulations
regarding the collection and use of personal information obtained by tracking the online activity
of an individual, and for other purposes.").
307. See id. § 3(b)(2)(B).
308. See FED. TRADE COMM'N 1998, supra note 151, § 3(A)(1).
309. These suggestions follow very closely the categories of the first four FTC Fair
Information principles. See id. § 3(A)(1)-(4).
310. See id. § 3(A)(1)-(2).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The infringement of consumer property in terms of the
creation, collection, and sale of geolocation data is a grave problem in
need of a serious solution. Multiple companies are using their GPS
chips and WPS databases to track the locations of mobile devices,
using the data for company purposes, and selling the data to third
parties.311 The consumer is largely unaware that this transaction is
occurring, to whom the data may be distributed, and who may be able
to purchase the information.312 Currently, the consumer receives no
notification of the security measures taken to keep this information
safe, or of what he can do to either limit or eliminate information he
does not wish others to retain.313
Congress should act to solve this privacy and information crisis
by enacting a comprehensive framework and a reasonable remedy that
will easily permit a private enforcement regime. Some of the bills in
Congress come close to formulating an adequate privacy regime;
however, each has deficiencies in one or more areas.314 Congress
should alter one of the existing bills or introduce a new piece of
legislation.
The ever-continuing march of technological advancement is not
only a good thing, it is essential to economic expansion as it facilitates
the optimization of resources through efficiency increases.
Technology, with its feathers of silicon and eggs of information
sharing, truly is the golden goose of the modern era. Ultimately,
however, the misappropriation of geolocation data by companies may
be threatening the very lifeblood of our gilded fowl. Consumer privacy
is of central importance, and Congress must act to protect it.
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